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This paper documents the conglomerate discount for all available German firms and
the DAX 30 firms in detail. It shows a moderate discount of about 0.06 based on
German comparable firms and of about 0.20 for a combined sample of German and
European peer groups. I further examine the relationship between the discount and
industry concentration as well as uncertainty of valuation. Finally, I document that
corporate governance behavior affects the conglomerate discount.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I examine whether there exists a diversification discount or a premium
in Germany, discuss several reasons for the results and investigate the relationship
between the diversification discount and corporate governance behavior. This em-
pirical work covers all publicly traded German companies that are available in the
Worldscope database between 1991 and 2003. I also investigate the largest German
companies in detail.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the diversification discount in
Germany and relates this topic to corporate governance behavior. The main contri-
bution of this work can be summarized by the following three points:
First, I document that the existing papers and the underlying procedures for
the valuation of diversified firms are biased due to measurement errors and provide
too high excess values. Therefore, the applied method uses another measure to get
unbiased valuation results.
Second, I consider two sets of peer groups, one with pure German firms and one
with German and European firms for the valuation process, to avoid a general over-
or undervaluation of German firms. In this context I also give a detailed description
how diversification affects the value of the 30 largest firms in Germany. Finally, I
discuss how valuation uncertainty and diversification trends affect the conglomerate
discount over time.
Third, I document how a potential conglomerate discount is related to corporate
governance developments. The idea is that a positive corporate governance behavior
overcomes several causes that lead to a conglomerate discount. To do so, I perform
a regression analysis with a corporate governance rating for all DAX 30 companies
and the conglomerate discount values from the previous analysis.
The results of this paper indicate that firms in Germany will be traded at a val-
uation discount of about 3% to 10% on average if one uses the standard methods
provided by Berger and Ofek (1995) as well as subsequent authors and at an average
valuation discount of 21% to 23% if one uses comparable companies from a combined
German and European sample. These are significant differences that are only caused
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by methodical discrepancies but not by fundamental changes. The valuation results
of the largest 30 firms in Germany (selected from the DAX 30 index) show that
diversification discounts or premiums can be associated with industry membership.
For instance, most firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry trade at a val-
uation discount, while firms in the technology and telecommunication industry trade
at a valuation premium. These results are robust over time. I also provide evidence
that higher uncertainties in valuation - measured as within peer group variation - are
associated with lower valuation accuracy, and also that an increasing diversification
over time leads to higher discounts on average.
I also test whether there exists a relationship between the conglomerate discount
and corporate governance behavior and show that a positive corporate governance
behavior of a company reduces the diversification discount or turns the discount
into a premium. Possible arguments for these findings are that a decline of agency
costs is associated with conglomerate firm structures. Some determinants to explain
the conglomerate discount are agency costs arising from ineffective internal capital
markets, suboptimal incentive compensation for managers, information asymmetries
between segment managers and increased incentive for rent seeking by managers. A
well-established corporate governance is a possible way to reduce these deficits and
also the discount of the company.
The idea that companies with several business segments trade at a discount com-
pared to their single-segment counterparts remains a well established result in finan-
cial research. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1994) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995)
show that the discount for U.S. companies ranges between 13% and 54% depending
on the valuation method. Recent papers by Campa and Kedia (2002) as well as Gra-
ham et al. (2002) show that there exists a strong selection bias which causes a large
fraction of the discount. Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) use establishment-
level data to value diversified companies. They present evidence that the discount
can be reduced or turns into a premium if more detailed company data are used.
There exists only few research that documents a discount for other countries than
the United States. Lins and Servaes (1999) find a discount for Japan and the United
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Kingdom of about 10% and 15%, respectively, while they are not able to determine a
discount for German firms. Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) present an average dis-
count of about 6% for Germany. Altogether, most researchers see negative impacts
of diversification on market value but the results cover a wide range and seem to be
quite ambiguous.
There is widespread research about corporate governance and the effects of corpo-
rate governance behavior on company values. Papers from Drobetz, Schillhofer and
Zimmermann (2003), Bauer, Gunster and Otten (2004) or Black (2001) document
that corporate governance is of relevance for the firm value. On the other hand there
is no paper that documents a significant relationship between corporate governance
and the conglomerate discount.
This paper has the following structure: in section 2 the related literature of the
conglomerate discount and diversification will be discussed. Section 3 presents the
dataset. Section 4 documents the diversification discount for all available German
firms from 1991 to 2003, and for the 30 largest firms in detail. Section 5 presents
reasons for the conglomerate discount and shows the relationship between excess
value and several explanatory variables. Section 6 relates the diversification discount
to corporate governance behavior. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There exists a comprehensive literature about the diversification discount. The idea
that diversified firms have a lower value than the sum of their segments dates back to
the empirical observations of Lang and Stulz (1994) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995).
They provide evidence that the discount of U.S. firms compared to their single-
segment counterparts in the same industry ranges between 13% and 54% depending
on the valuation multiple and the year considered. Typical multiples in this context
are firm value to sales, firm value to assets, firm value to EBIT and Tobin’s q. Servaes
(1996) supports the findings of the previous literature. He covers an earlier period
from 1961 to 1976 and calculates significant conglomerate discounts especially in the
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1970s. His results are robust to differences in industry-adjustments and additional
control variables like size as well as variables that measure financial constraints.
Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) use the common valuation methodology but
other than the standard data sources provided by Compustat. Villalonga compares
BITS (Business Information Tracking Series) and Compustat data for firms in the
United States and shows that the first data source provides a conglomerate premium
while the latter a valuation discount. The premium is robust both over time and
with respect to different control variables.
Summarized, I find that all investigations use similar valuation approaches, datasets
and multiples. The typical multiples are based on sales, assets, EBIT or Tobin’s q,
the averaging method uses mean or median and typical excess values are calculated
by using the natural logarithm of the ratio between the observed market value and
the imputed value.
There are only few papers that consider other countries than the U.S. to document
the conglomerate discount. Lins and Servaes (1999) investigate firms in Japan, the
United Kingdom and Germany. They find a discount of 10% for Japanese and of 15%
for British firms, while there is no discount for German firms. Due to deficits of their
database they only use sales multiples. They explain the non-existence of a discount
in Germany with the concentrated ownership structure of insiders that leads to higher
firm values. Another paper from Lins and Servaes (2002) investigates seven emerging
market countries. They find that the diversification discount is about 7% on average.
They explain the discount with a lower profitability of diversified firms, a membership
of industrial groups and a management ownership concentration between 10% and
30%. Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2002) cover 8,000 companies from 35 countries
and find that the conglomerate discount is negatively related to the level of capital
market integration and development. They also provide evidence that a country’s
legal system and the ownership structure of the firm affect the value of diversified
firms. Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) show that cash holdings of diversified firms
lead to biased results. After deducting cash from the firm value the average discount
is about 6%. Overall, the discount for countries outside the United States ranges
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between 5% and 15%.
3 Data Selection
This study uses market and accounting data from the Thomson Financial Worldscope
database. For the investigations I require three datasets. The first contains all Ger-
man multi-segment firms, the second contains all German single-segment firms and
the third contains all German and European single-segment firms. Here, European
firms are drawn from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (Euro countries). The sample
datasets cover data from all years between 1991 and 2003. I do not exclude financial
firms because a significant fraction of German firms operates in the financial industry
or contains segments in this industry. I also provide summarized results for datasets
without financial companies to show that financial companies do not produce deviat-
ing figures. All three datasets have the following restrictions: market price, number
of shares, net sales, total debt and total assets have to be available for each firm and
each year. Information about net sales, assets and industry membership based on
SIC-codes for at least one industry segment have to be available. The sum of segment
sales has to be within 1% of net sales of the whole firm. 5.6% of the observations in
2002 show deviations of more than 1% which is a secondary problem. For assets the
quantity of observations that exceeds 1% is 58.4%. Together with the fact that I have
less segment information for assets than for sales I would lose too many observations
to produce reliable results. Therefore, I scale the current asset value A of segment i












is the scaling factor, and SEGf is the number of segments
for firm f. The ratio of total assets and the sum of segment assets for one firm will be
multiplied with each segment. Finally, the sum of the scaled segment assets is equal
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to total assets. This procedure results in a dataset of 3,228 firm-years for German
multi-segment firms, 3,080 firm-years for German single-segment firms and 27,492
firm-years for European single-segment firms.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of German multi-segment firms and
German and European single-segment firms that I need for the analysis. I identify
conglomerates if they have more than one segment based on the 2-digit SIC-code and
stand-alone firms if they have only one segment. Panel A contains all firms that are
listed in Germany and have more than one segment. The results are separated for
each year from 1995 to 2003. The years 1991 to 1994 show similar results as in 1995
and are therefore suppressed.
The number of multi-segment firms increases over the years from 227 in 1995 to
402 in 2003, i.e. more conglomerates operate in the market. The figures for total
assets and sales also show an increase. Mean assets double from 1995 to 2000. In
2003 mean asset values are 5 times higher than in 1995. The standard deviation also
shows a sharp increase from 1995 to 2003. Sales values also increase significantly
from 1995 to 2003 but the growth rate is much lower compared to assets growth.
Mean sales increase by about 40%. There is also a slight increase in the average
number of segments from 3.74 to 4.11. This trend to more diversification has also
been documented by other researchers1.
Panel B comprises all firms that have only one industry segment. I use this
dataset to select and create peer groups for the estimation of segment values of Panel
A’s conglomerates. The number of firms increases from 236 to 302 over the years.
This is less than in Panel A. The reason is that the propensity to diversify increases.
I am able to find more firms that diversify their business than firms that concentrate
their business. Thus, several firms shift from Panel B to Panel A over the years.
While the overall number of firms that are listed in Germany increases strongly, the
number of single-segment firms increases less, and there is also a significant number
of firms that expands the number of business segments. Mean assets and mean sales
are almost constant over time for single-segment firms. Assets only increase by about
1See for instance Servaes (1996), Lins and Servaes (1999).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of German and European firms
This table displays descriptive statistics for the underlying datasets from 1995 to 2003.
Data from 1991 to 1994 show similar statistics and are therefore suppressed. In panel
A only firms are covered that have more than one segment and are located in Germany.
In panel B all firms with exactly one segment and German location are presented. In
panel C all European firms with one segment are displayed. All assets and sales values
are converted to Euro and in billions. Segment information are based on 2-digit SIC-
levels. Std refers to standard deviation, obs. counts the number of firms per year. The
right-most column presents the mean number of segments.
year obs. assets sales SEG
min mean max std min mean max std mean
Panel A: German multi-segment firms
1995 227 0.00 3.96 366.33 25.11 0.00 2.74 52.94 6.97 3.74
1996 243 0.00 4.52 450.34 30.12 0.00 2.77 54.37 7.46 3.63
1997 250 0.00 5.17 530.36 34.62 0.00 3.08 63.43 8.77 3.70
1998 262 0.00 6.03 621.14 40.37 0.00 3.50 131.78 11.86 3.61
1999 305 0.00 6.79 822.87 49.45 0.00 3.20 149.99 12.31 3.53
2000 341 0.00 7.44 693.70 47.07 0.00 3.56 162.38 13.62 3.70
2001 394 0.00 10.25 914.38 68.55 0.00 3.67 152.87 13.62 3.71
2002 404 0.00 10.33 810.38 62.40 0.00 3.45 149.58 12.79 3.98
2003 402 0.00 19.59 896.49 91.69 0.00 3.00 136.44 16.65 4.11
Panel B: German single-segment firms
1995 236 0.00 8.00 246.85 29.84 0.00 1.47 45.05 4.65 1
1996 268 0.00 8.04 286.17 31.84 0.00 1.40 51.19 4.79 1
1997 274 0.00 8.97 345.32 36.64 0.00 1.49 51.02 4.61 1
1998 304 0.00 9.42 446.93 45.37 0.00 1.46 57.98 5.17 1
1999 333 0.00 9.63 482.11 48.14 0.00 1.44 69.06 5.25 1
2000 313 0.00 8.44 925.79 65.44 0.00 1.14 73.22 5.40 1
2001 315 0.00 7.56 697.10 56.69 0.00 0.90 44.15 3.65 1
2002 280 0.00 5.47 671.50 43.66 0.00 0.68 38.57 2.85 1
2003 302 0.00 9.91 469.38 51.31 0.00 1.10 24.01 3.27 1
Panel C: German and European single-segment firms
1995 2036 0.00 7.56 253.50 27.73 0.00 1.22 45.05 3.52 1
1996 2376 0.00 7.43 351.00 29.85 0.00 1.12 51.19 3.55 1
1997 2550 0.00 7.78 379.56 32.46 0.00 1.13 51.02 3.45 1
1998 2660 0.00 7.57 446.93 35.96 0.00 1.14 57.98 3.90 1
1999 2658 0.00 8.86 696.97 43.82 0.00 1.18 69.06 4.19 1
2000 2469 0.00 7.97 925.79 51.68 0.00 1.23 73.22 5.31 1
2001 2367 0.00 6.55 824.26 48.97 0.00 0.90 54.87 3.70 1
2002 2130 0.00 6.53 709.33 44.64 0.00 0.80 45.45 3.23 1
2003 2225 0.00 11.23 559.24 52.58 0.00 1.22 34.65 3.58 1
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25%, while sales decrease from 1.47 to 1.10. If I compare Panel A and Panel B one
can see a clear pattern. In 1995 mean assets for single-segment firms are twice as
much as for conglomerates, while in 2003 the values are the other way around. Sales
for single-segment firms in 1995 are about 50% of multi-segment firms. This ratio
decreases to 18.3%. So one can see that there is a strong increase in sales and assets
for multi-segment firms, while single-segment firms almost stay constant.
Panel C displays all European and German firms with one segment. This dataset
will also be used for segment valuation purposes. I detect an increase in the number
of firms from 1995 to 1999 by about 30%. Then the number decreases. In 2003 it is
almost equal to 1995. The mean assets in 2003 are about 50% higher than in 1995,
while sales are almost equal.
I will not only document the conglomerate discount for all German firms on
average but also for the largest 30 firms in Germany in detail. Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics for all German firms that are a member of the DAX 30 in 2004.
Data are from Worldscope for the year 2002. The table displays sales, assets and
enterprise value from the balance sheet as well as the number of segments and the
primary SIC-code.
There exist 6 firms (Allianz, HVB, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche
Boerse, Muenchener Rück) that operate in the financial industry. 3 are retail banks,
2 are insurance firms and one is a stock exchange. The sales and assets figures are ex-
traordinary high, which is a typical characteristic of firms within that industry. Only
Deutsche Boerse is different because the main operations are transaction services.
All firms except HVB have between 5 and 7 segments and are aligned to the same
1-digit SIC-code. There are also 6 firms (Altana, BASF, Bayer, Fresenius, Henkel,
Schering) in the chemical or pharmaceutical industry. BASF and Bayer are about 3
to 4 times larger than the other firms. Altana and Fresenius have only one segment,
while the other firms cover between 5 and 7 segments. There exist 4 firms (BMW,
Continental, DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen) that operate in the automotive industry.
While BMW, DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen are car manufacturers, Continental is
a car equipment supplier. The size of the firms is very inhomogeneous. The number
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of DAX30 firms
This table displays descriptive statistics for all firms that are listed in the German DAX
30 index for the year 2004. Data are from Worldscope for the year 2002. Sales is net sales,
ta is total assets, ev is enterprise value, evsa is enterprise value divided by net sales, evta
is enterprise value divided by total assets, seg shows the number of segments based on the
2-digit-SIC segment code, SIC is the primary SIC-code. All values are in millions and local
currency. Firms are listed in alphabetic order.
name sales ta ev evsa evta seg SIC
Adidas-Salomon 6,523.41 4,091.11 5,264.68 0.80 1.28 3 3149
Allianz 92,232.00 810,378.00 252,042.94 2.73 0.31 5 6331
Altana 2,608.67 2,200.61 6,025.37 2.31 2.73 1 2834
BASF 32,215.50 33,881.60 24,084.75 0.74 0.71 7 2821
Bayer 28,958.00 40,725.00 24,765.83 0.85 0.60 6 3089
BMW 42,282.00 55,319.00 45,765.48 1.08 0.82 4 3711
Commerzbank 21,351.00 416,843.00 218,546.17 10.23 0.52 7 6021
Continental 11,408.30 7,933.10 4,172.59 0.36 0.52 5 3011
DaimlerChrysler 149,583.00 186,194.00 108,635.22 0.72 0.58 5 3711
Deutsche Bank 56,029.00 754,455.00 232,038.12 4.14 0.30 6 6021
Deutsche Boerse 1,170.90 6,531.00 7,805.30 6.66 1.19 7 6231
Dt. Lufthansa 16,971.40 18,956.80 8,210.21 0.48 0.43 6 4512
Deutsche Post 39,255.00 161,201.00 78,052.12 1.98 0.48 5 4215
Deutsche Telekom 53,689.00 125,814.00 115,722.86 2.15 0.92 5 4813
E.ON 36,126.00 110,023.00 50,300.92 1.39 0.45 4 4931
Fresenius 5,349.08 6,420.48 6,120.77 1.14 0.95 1 8071
Henkel 9,656.00 8,187.00 9,511.48 0.98 1.16 5 2841
HVB 38,571.00 671,499.00 432,353.07 11.20 0.64 1 6021
Infineon 5,207.00 10,131.00 5,765.48 1.10 0.56 1 3674
Linde 8,726.00 12,062.00 7,468.17 0.85 0.61 5 2813
MAN 16,040.00 11,248.00 3,478.92 0.21 0.30 7 3711
Metro 51,526.00 21,839.00 13,103.11 0.25 0.60 5 5149
Muenchener Rk 43,646.00 182,144.00 25,299.89 0.58 0.13 6 6331
RWE 43,487.00 92,680.00 43,659.92 1.00 0.47 8 4911
SAP 7,412.83 5,353.98 23,299.03 3.14 4.35 5 7371
Schering 5,023.00 5,392.00 8,245.75 1.64 1.52 5 2834
Siemens 84,016.00 74,253.00 42,572.50 0.50 0.57 10 3661
ThyssenKrupp 36,698.00 30,251.00 11,213.53 0.30 0.37 9 3312
TUI 20,302.40 15,235.30 8,651.01 0.42 0.56 6 4725
Volkswagen 86,948.00 107,488.00 58,842.40 0.67 0.54 2 3711
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of segments ranges between 2 and 5. All firms have the same 1-digit SIC-code. E.ON
and RWE are utility firms. The financial figures are similar, while the number of seg-
ments for RWE is twice as much as for E.ON. 3 firms (Deutsche Telekom, Infineon,
SAP) are classified in the technology and telecommunication industry. Deutsche
Telekom is the only firm in the telecommunication industry. The other firms in this
segment are much smaller. 2 firms are classified as transportation firms. These are
Deutsche Lufthansa and Deutsche Post. The number of segments is equal but the
size is different. Metro is the only firm that operates in the wholesale and retail
industry, respectively. 4 firms (Linde, MAN, Siemens, ThyssenKrupp) operate in the
manufacturing sector. All firms in this industry are highly diversified and have more
than 5 segments. The dispersion of the firm size is also high. The last 2 remaining
firms can be classified as consumer product suppliers. While Adidas-Salomon has
only three segments, TUI as a former manufacturing firm has six segments. One
can see that only 4 firms are single-segment firms, while the rest has 5 segments on
average. The table also documents that large firms have more segments than small
firms. For instance, all firms in the sample with one segment have sales below 6 bil-
lion Euros2, while the firms with more than 6 segments have an average sales value
that is close to 30 billion Euros. This is consistent with the previous table and the
statistics of other authors3.
4 The Conglomerate Discount for German Firms
In this section I investigate whether there exists a conglomerate discount or a con-
glomerate premium for German firms on average. I cover a time period from 1991 to
2003. I calculate excess values by comparing the observed firm value and the imputed
value, which is based on sales as well as assets multiples drawn from German and
European single-segment firms. I also present detailed valuation and conglomerate
results for the largest 30 firms in Germany based on the DAX 30 index put together
2HVB is an exception due to the banking characteristics.
3See Servaes (1996). He shows that single-segment firms have median assets of 77.1 million $, while
multi-segment firms have median assets of 115.1 million $. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that median sales




To investigate value differences between single- and multi-segment firms, I apply the
valuation methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) but apply some modifications.
Excess value is calculated by using the natural logarithm of the ratio of the observed
enterprise value to the imputed enterprise value. Market value will be calculated by
multiplying market value per share with the number of shares. Enterprise value is
the sum of market value of equity and book value of total debt. The imputed value
of the whole firm is the sum of the imputed values of all available segments based on
2-digit SIC-codes.
A segment’s imputed value can be calculated by using the sales or assets value
of the segment multiplied with either the arithmetic mean or median ratio of the
firm value to the accounting item of an industry peer group or the geometric mean
of that ratio. While the mean and the median ratios have been used by several
authors, the geometric mean is a new measure. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1994),
Servaes (1996) and Villalonga (2004a) use the arithmetic mean to average ratios from
comparable companies. Berger and Ofek (1995), Lins and Servaes (1999), Campa
and Kedia (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002) as well as Graham, Lemmon and Wolf
(2002) operate with the median of these ratios. Villalonga (2004b) uses median
averaging for sales and assets multiples, while she applies arithmetic mean to Tobin’s
q. She shows that excess values4 based on Tobin’s q are notably lower than on
assets5, which is a remarkable result, because assets multipliers and Tobin’s q follow
a similar data definition. I discuss the averaging method for the peer group’s sales
or assets ratio that leads to the valuation multiple in detail, because Dittmann and
Maug (2005) show that arithmetic mean averaging produces skewed results. This
4In this case excess value based on assets is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s market
value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where
a segment’s value is equal to the segment’s assets multiplied by its industry median ratio of market value
to assets. Excess value based on q is the difference between firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the
imputed q’s of its segments, where a segment’s imputed q is the industry average q.
5For instance excess value based on assets multiplier is -0.076, while it is -0.174 for Tobin’s q.
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means in the case of the conglomerate discount that the calculated excess values
based on arithmetic mean averaging is too high. They further provide evidence
that a logarithmic transformation before averaging or the use of geometric mean
averaging procedures result in unbiased excess values and produce smaller discount
values. Therefore, this paper uses and displays excess values based on the median
and geometric mean averaging procedure.
The selection of peer group firms is also of critical importance. Therefore, I
propose an algorithm used by Alford (1992) to identify comparable firms. I start
with the 2-digit SIC code and select all single segment firms with the same code. If
there are less than 5 firms then I use the 1-digit SIC code. If there are less than
5 firms on the 1-digit level then I use the whole market. For about 60% of the
segments it is possible to identify comparable companies based on 2-digits. 30% can
be matched on the 1-digit code.
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 3 documents the conglomerate discount for German firms from 1991 to 2003.
I use the methodology proposed by Berger and Ofek (1995) with some differences.
The averaging method for the combination is of critical importance. Therefore,
each segment of a firm will be valued separately by multiplying the sales (assets)
value with the median ratio between enterprise value and sales (assets) of the peer
group. This valuation procedure is coherent with several other studies. As mentioned
previously, this leads to an unbiased result, if I use median as the averaging method.
Additionally, I perform the same procedure with geometric mean instead of median
aggregation. The table reports for each year the mean and median excess value for
sales and assets multipliers with median and geometric mean averaging calculation.
In 1991 I have not enough information to calculate excess values based on asset
multipliers.
I make an additional distinction between different peer group samples. In panel
A I use only German firms with single-segments as peer groups to calculate excess
values. The results are comparable to the findings of Lins and Servaes (1999). They
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calculate a marginal excess value of 1.1% in 1992 and 5.7% in 1994. Schwetzler and
Reimund (2003) find an excess value of about 6% for a pooled sample from 1988 to
2001, while I calculate an excess value of 6% on average based on median averag-
ing. In Panel B also European firms together with German firms will be considered.
Dittmann and Weiner (2004) show that the selection of comparable firms from Euro-
pean countries improves valuation accuracy compared to the exclusive selection from
the same country. This could lead to a biased result because a conglomerate dis-
count could be entirely occur due to the fact that firms are generally undervalued in
Germany. I therefore perform a robustness check and test whether German firms are
undervalued in a European context. The firms will have no conglomerate discount
and should therefore provide excess values close to zero if they are not undervalued.
On the other hand if these firms are undervalued one should see significant excess
values. Additional influences like different accounting standards may lead to devia-
tions from the zero point but these differences should be minor. I calculate excess
values for German single-segment firms based on European peer groups in Panel C.
I test differences of means between single- and multi-segment excess values (Panel B
and C) to get reliable results.
The overall results of the analysis show that there is a small diversification dis-
count independently of the valuation method and the peer group sample selection. A
closer look at the figures provides some further insights. Panel A documents a mean
excess value over all years from -0.03 to -0.10 depending on the averaging and mul-
tiple valuation method. This range is also documented by Schwetzler and Reimund
(2003). They cover German firms from 1988 to 2001 and document an excess value
of about 6% on average. It can be seen that excess values differ significantly over
time. In 1992 and 1994 I detect average discounts based on sales multiples between
-0.04 and -0.05 which is coherent with the finding of Lins and Servaes (1999). Assets
multiples provide much higher discounts for the two years. While excess values be-
tween 1992 and 1999 are relatively low, there is a significant increase from 2000 to
2002. The geometric mean averaging method provides results that are slightly below
the median method.
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Table 3: Conglomerate discount for German firms
Excess value is calculated from 1991 to 2003 for all German firms. It is defined as the
natural logarithm of the ratio between observed firm value and imputed value. The
imputed value is the sum of the segment’s imputed values. A segment’s imputed value
is the sales or assets value of the segment multiplied with either the median ratio of the
firm value to the accounting item of an industry peer group or the geometric mean of that
ratio. I determine peer groups at the 2-digit SIC level. Peer group companies have one
segment. Panel A shows the results for conglomerates based on peer groups containing
only German firms, panel B the results for conglomerates based on peer groups containing
German and European firms, panel C the results for single-segment firms based on German
and European firms. If the sum of segment assets deviates from total assets then segment
assets are scaled to total assets with the observed proportion. If segment values are not
available then excess value is not displayed. The significance of the difference between
means of single- and multi-segment firms (Panel B and C) is assessed using a t-test. The
last row (mean II) in panel A and B shows average results if financial firms are excluded.
Panel A: Conglomerates and German peer groups
year sales basis asset basis
median geo. mean median geo. mean
mean med. mean med. mean med. mean med.
1991 −0.24 −0.28 −0.25 −0.30
1992 −0.04 −0.17 −0.13 −0.21 −0.21 −0.21 0.15 0.15
1993 −0.00 −0.13 −0.12 −0.20 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33
1994 −0.05 −0.04 −0.08 −0.16 −0.13 −0.11 −0.10 −0.11
1995 −0.05 −0.16 −0.17 −0.25 −0.29 −0.26 −0.27 −0.34
1996 −0.13 −0.16 −0.16 −0.17 −0.10 −0.12 −0.12 −0.15
1997 0.10 0.01 0.04 −0.05 0.00 −0.10 0.00 −0.10
1998 0.03 −0.05 −0.05 −0.14 0.06 −0.14 0.06 −0.11
1999 −0.04 −0.09 −0.24 −0.31 0.01 −0.06 −0.10 −0.20
2000 −0.11 −0.22 −0.22 −0.37 −0.03 −0.12 −0.09 −0.23
2001 −0.16 −0.29 −0.16 −0.29 −0.19 −0.25 −0.16 −0.25
2002 −0.08 −0.19 −0.08 −0.21 −0.08 −0.16 −0.05 −0.14
2003 0.22 −0.04 0.29 0.01 −0.08 −0.10 −0.06 −0.17
mean −0.06 −0.15 −0.10 −0.20 −0.07 −0.12 −0.03 −0.11
mean II −0.06 −0.07 −0.12 −0.13 −0.11 −0.09 −0.05 −0.13
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Panel B: Conglomerates and European peer groups
year sales basis asset basis
median geo. mean median geo. mean
mean med. mean med. mean med. mean med.
1991 −0.22∗∗∗−0.18 −0.24∗∗∗−0.24
1992 −0.28∗∗∗−0.29 −0.30∗∗∗−0.33 −0.40∗∗∗−0.40 −0.41∗∗∗−0.41
1993 −0.24∗∗∗−0.29 −0.26∗∗∗−0.32 −0.37∗∗∗−0.37 −0.29∗∗∗−0.29
1994 −0.28∗∗∗−0.34 −0.30∗∗∗−0.38 −0.27∗∗∗−0.28 −0.25∗∗∗−0.24
1995 −0.29∗∗∗−0.34 −0.32∗∗∗−0.39 −0.38∗∗∗−0.32 −0.41∗∗∗−0.38
1996 −0.35∗∗∗−0.33 −0.39∗∗∗−0.43 −0.25 −0.19 −0.26∗ −0.22
1997 −0.33∗∗∗−0.37 −0.33∗∗∗−0.38 −0.13 −0.04 −0.17∗ −0.07
1998 −0.10∗∗ −0.22 −0.13∗∗ −0.27 0.04 −0.14 0.01∗∗ −0.21
1999 −0.23∗∗∗−0.19 −0.24∗∗∗−0.32 −0.10 −0.08 −0.13 −0.17
2000 −0.19 −0.27 −0.28 −0.39∗ −0.06 −0.07 −0.14∗ −0.18
2001 −0.29∗∗ −0.37 −0.36 −0.44∗ −0.22∗∗∗−0.23 −0.24∗∗∗−0.28
2002 −0.25 −0.31 −0.29 −0.39 −0.25∗∗∗−0.20 −0.25∗∗∗−0.24
2003 0.02 −0.17 −0.03 −0.23 −0.12∗ −0.12 −0.15∗∗ −0.19
mean −0.23∗∗∗−0.28 −0.27∗∗ −0.35 −0.21∗∗∗−0.20 −0.23∗∗∗−0.24
mean II −0.14 −0.19 −0.22 −0.21 −0.20 −0.15 −0.18 −0.16
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Panel C: Single-segment firms and European peer groups
year sales basis asset basis
median geo. mean median geo. mean
mean med. mean med. mean med. mean med.
1991 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.28 0.21 0.29
1992 −0.03 −0.01 −0.04 −0.07 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.11
1993 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 −0.06 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.10
1994 −0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.05 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.08
1995 0.07 −0.08 0.06 −0.16 0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
1996 0.00 −0.11 −0.03 −0.21 −0.03 −0.05 −0.06 −0.06
1997 −0.06 −0.09 −0.07 −0.16 −0.06 −0.01 −0.09 −0.06
1998 0.09 −0.04 0.05 −0.12 −0.09 −0.01 −0.14 −0.09
1999 0.17 −0.05 0.07 −0.16 0.00 −0.05 −0.04 −0.14
2000 −0.07 −0.12 −0.16 −0.25 −0.05 −0.10 −0.13 −0.22
2001 −0.14 −0.20 −0.22 −0.30 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.07
2002 −0.13 −0.21 −0.22 −0.30 0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
2003 −0.07 −0.22 −0.10 −0.25 0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.09
mean −0.01 −0.09 −0.05 −0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00
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Panel B documents excess values if I use a combination of German and Euro-
pean single-segment companies as peer groups but the same valuation methodology.
Compared to the valuation results of panel A I find significantly higher excess values
for almost all years, which is an interesting result that might has different reasons.
The average excess values over all years are also significantly higher independently
of the averaging method or the multiple type. One possible reason for these results
could be the fact that the number of comparable single-segment companies is lower
in panel A. The average number of comparable companies over all segments, firms
and years in panel A is about 9, while the average peer group size in panel B is about
2.5 times higher. Dittmann and Maug (2005) show that the peer group size is of
critical importance for the provided valuation results. I am not able to conclude that
the results of table B are caused by a generic undervaluation of conglomerates. It
could also be a possible explanation that German firms always trade at a discount
on average.
Therefore in panel C, I perform the same calculation as in panel B for all single-
segment firms available in Germany. I compare the observed market value of these
firms with the estimated value based on German and European peer group selection.
I show that there is almost no discount on average over all years. This indicates that
there is no general discount for German firms. I document this by using standard
T-tests.
The results do not differ substantially if I exclude financial companies from the
datasets. The average results over all years in panel A and B (mean II) deviate by
about 0.04 on average from the results with financial companies (mean).
Table 4 documents the conglomerate discount for each firm that is a member of
the DAX 30 index in 2004. I show the results for two representative years (1996,
2002). I use the same methodology as in the previous analysis for all German firms.
In Panel A of table 4 a peer group is selected from all German firms with only one
business segment that have the same 2-digit SIC-code as the valued segment. If there
are less than 5 peer group members then the 1-digit SIC-code is considered. Other
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reseachers6 identify conglomerates with 3- or 4-digit SIC-codes. I see no significant
differences for the DAX 30 firms if I consider these definitions and therefore omit the
results. Panel B shows the results when peer firms are not only from Germany but
additionally from a European group of companies. The sum of all imputed segment
values leads to the imputed value of the firm. The deviation between the real value
and the imputed value is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of these two
figures. To reduce complexity two representative years are displayed. If I am not
able to calculate an excess value or the firm is not listed in the specific year, then no
value is displayed.
Table 4 reveals that firms in some industries trade at a discount while other trade
at a premium. The six firms in the financial industry provide no clear trend in
panel A. Muenchener Rück and Deutsche Boerse are the only firms with a premium
in all years displayed and for both multiples. For Allianz I find a premium based
on sales multiples in most cases but a discount for assets. If I consider German
and European peer groups in panel B, I detect that there is a premium for Allianz,
Commerzbank, Deutsche Boerse, HVB and Muenchener Rück. Deutsche Bank shows
a premium based on sales multiples and a discount based on assets multiples. Firms
in the pharmaceutical and chemical industry like Altana, BASF, Fresenius, Henkel
and Schering show a premium for all excess value calculations. If I use European peer
groups in panel B, the firms BASF, Bayer and Henkel have negative excess values.
The automobile industry provides negative excess values for almost all methods. Only
BMW has a premium based on assets multiples and German peer groups. One reason
could be the high number of segments that each of the firms contain. The average
number of different segments for the four firms in the automobile industry is 5, while
for the previous industry the average number of segments is 3. In the European
environment German firms in the automobile industry also have a discount. The two
firms in the utility industry E.ON and RWE also trade at a discount in most cases
independently of the underlying peer group and the valuation method. These results
can be related to the high number of segments. Telecommunication and technology
6See for instance Lang and Stulz (1994), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002).
19
Table 4: Conglomerate discount for DAX30 firms
Excess value is calculated for three representative years for all DAX 30 firms. The firms
are drawn from the index put together in 2004. Excess value is the natural logarithm
of the ratio between observed firm value and imputed value. The imputed value is
the sum of the imputed values of each segment. A segment’s imputed value is the
sales or assets value of the segment multiplied with either the median ratio of the firm
value to the accounting item of an industry peer group or the geometric mean of that
ratio. A peer group contains only single-segment firms based on 2-digit SIC-codes.
Panel A shows the results for peer groups containing only German firms, panel B the
results for peer groups containing German and European firms. If the sum of segment
assets deviates from total assets then segment assets are scaled to total assets with the
observed proportion. If segment information are not available then excess value is not
displayed.
Panel A: German peer groups
firm sales basis asset basis
geo. mean median geo. mean median
1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002
Adidas 0.97 0.30 0.92 0.39
Allianz 0.41 0.14 0.57 -0.04 -0.09 -0.32
Altana 1.29 1.28 1.45 1.42 1.24 1.38
BASF 0.37 0.19 0.54 0.33 0.47 0.17 0.45 0.31
Bayer 0.62 0.36 0.75 0.47 0.25 -0.06 0.22 0.04
BMW -0.30 -0.19 -0.66 -0.37 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.17
Commerzbank -0.03 1.94 -0.11 1.73
Continental -0.21 -0.44 -0.36 -0.39 -0.20 -0.19
DaimlerChr. -0.28 -0.39 -0.02 -0.07
Deutsche Bank -0.23 0.24 -0.31 0.00 -0.52 -0.82
Dt. Boerse 1.20 1.29 0.72 0.58
Dt. Lufthansa -1.11 -1.01 -0.96 -0.80 -0.42 -0.53
Deutsche Post -0.32 -0.42 -0.09 -0.38
Dt. Telekom 0.68 0.90 0.75 0.97 0.68 0.46
EON -0.24 -0.38 0.03 0.14 -0.32 -0.68 -0.26 -0.43
Fresenius 2.38 0.05 2.27 0.09 0.91 0.84
Henkel 0.11 0.46 0.25 0.60 0.40 0.53
HVB 0.02 1.59 -0.06 1.33
Infineon 0.72 0.59
Linde 0.82 0.41 0.86 0.55 -0.13 -0.01
MAN -0.33 -0.85 -0.17 -0.85 -0.38 -0.41
Metro -1.10 -0.52 -0.62 -0.81 -0.16 -0.30
Muenchener Rk 0.33 0.31 0.48 0.58 0.00 0.15
RWE -0.30 -0.50 -0.15 0.11 -0.42 -0.70 -0.37 -0.45
SAP 1.10 1.70 0.55 1.78
Schering 1.15 1.05 1.32 1.07 0.70 0.75
Siemens -0.18 -0.99 -0.15 -0.86 -0.31 -0.73 -0.32 -0.64
ThyssenKrupp -0.77 -0.79 -0.22 -0.21
TUI -0.35 -0.85 -0.06 -0.70 0.19 0.11
Volkswagen 0.39 0.17 0.58 0.22 -0.08 -0.12
mean 0.25 0.20 0.31 0.24 0.11 -0.01 0.10 -0.02
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Panel B: European peer groups
firm sales basis asset basis
geo. mean median geo. mean median
1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002
Adidas 0.57 0.17 0.55 0.32
Allianz 0.37 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.32 0.36
Altana 0.15 0.03 0.58 0.21 0.80 0.93
BASF -0.70 -1.00 -0.30 -0.82 -0.02 -0.39 0.06 -0.31
Bayer -0.57 -0.64 -0.17 -0.48 -0.38 -0.52 -0.31 -0.45
BMW -0.63 -0.10 -0.74 -0.04 -0.10 0.26 -0.04 -0.01
Commerzbank 0.77 2.20 0.61 2.15
Continental -0.89 -0.54 -0.95 -0.47 -0.38 -0.41
DaimlerChr. -0.45 -0.20 -0.17 -0.33
Deutsche Bank 0.55 0.63 0.40 0.52 -0.25 -0.31
Dt. Boerse 0.66 0.88 0.43 0.44
Dt. Lufthansa -0.79 -0.99 -0.78 -0.94 -0.60 -0.63
Deutsche Post 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.13
Dt. Telekom -0.32 0.75 -0.34 0.53 0.22 0.07
EON -0.59 -0.45 -0.38 -0.43 -0.45 -0.69 -0.40 -0.57
Fresenius 0.90 -1.07 1.17 -0.62 -0.12 -0.10
Henkel -0.92 -0.80 -0.56 -0.63 -0.05 0.07
HVB 0.82 2.11 0.66 1.93
Infineon 0.22 0.42
Linde -0.03 -0.48 0.15 -0.31 -0.51 -0.41
MAN -0.81 -1.34 -0.74 -1.03 -0.90 -0.84
Metro -1.00 -0.57 -1.03 -0.66 -0.21 -0.27
Muenchener Rk 0.28 0.06 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.92
RWE -0.82 -0.62 -0.68 -0.62 -0.75 -0.63 -0.74 -0.51
SAP 1.28 1.17 1.48 1.29
Schering 0.02 -0.03 0.45 0.11 0.35 0.44
Siemens -1.01 -1.28 -0.80 -1.26 -0.89 -0.46 -0.83 -0.40
ThyssenKrupp -1.04 -0.81 -0.67 -0.65
TUI -0.84 -1.10 -0.68 -0.83 -0.42 -0.41
Volkswagen -0.30 -0.54 -0.13 -0.11 -0.72 -0.54
mean -0.18 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.39 -0.19 -0.34 -0.15
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firms from Deutsche Telekom to SAP show a strong premium based on German and
European peer groups, respectively. Deutsche Lufthansa and Deutsche Post show a
discount for German peer firms. If I use European peer firms Deutsche Lufthansa
still has a discount while Deutsche Post a premium. Metro is the only firm that
operates in the retail and wholesale industry. This firm consists of 7 segments on
average and trades at a discount for all specifications and all peer groups. The
next four firms Linde, MAN, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp are manufacturing firms.
The average number of segments for this industry group is relatively high with 7
segments. For MAN, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp I detect discounts with a broad
range, while Linde shows a premium for most specifications. The last two firms
operate in the consumer industry. Adidas Salomon has 3 segments on average and
shows a premium between 0.17 and 0.97, while TUI has a discount between 0.11
and -1.10. The results of this analysis show that discounts and premiums depend on
three determinants. First, firms with a high number of segments like Siemens (10
segments), ThyssenKrupp (9 segments), RWE (8 segments) or MAN (7 segments)
tend to have a high excess value. Second, for several industries like banking and
financial service providers, automobile producers or utilities I find a discount for all
member firms. One reason is the higher diversification of some industries another
seems to be a general undervaluation. Third, the underlying peer groups have a
significant influence on the valuation results.
Overall, I find that pure German and mixed German and European peer groups
lead to different results. I also document that the discount for German firms is low
on average but the fluctuation from one year to the next is high. I will now discuss
some explanations for these findings.
5 Explaining the Conglomerate Discount
In this section I will provide several explanations for my previous results that there ex-
ists a conglomerate discount in Germany. The first analysis shows how uncertainties
about valuation have developed over time and how this is related to the conglomerate
discount. I measure the variation of multiples and assume that a higher variation
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leads to higher valuation errors and higher excess values. In my second analysis I
calculate different diversification measures and their change over time. I relate these
results to the development of the conglomerate discount over time. My assumption
is that a higher degree of diversification over all firms within one year leads to a
higher discount, while a lower diversification leads to a lower discount. I support the
analysis by running fixed-effects regressions.
5.1 Uncertainties about Valuation
In this section I want to find out whether there is a relation between uncertainties
about valuation and the conglomerate discount. I expect to find that a significant
fraction of the diversification discount is caused by valuation errors and variation of
multiples and not by a general undervaluation of conglomerates. Due to the fact
that the selection of peer groups is of critical importance for the valuation accuracy,
one should see a better prediction of the real firm value, if the variance between
the peer multiples is relatively low. On the other hand if the variance is high, one
should see higher valuation errors that can deviate in both directions. Bhojraj and
Lee (2003) show that a classification of firms that have more homogeneous financial
ratios provide more accurate valuation predictions. Dittmann and Maug (2005) show
that an increase in the standard deviation within industries by 1/3 leads to an increase
in valuation errors of more than 100% for percentage errors.
I calculate the annual variation in multiples V, i.e. the overall average standard

























is the standard deviation of the peer group mul-
tiples of segment j, sgn contains the number of different segments of firm f and F is
the number of all firms in the sample. Cf,j is the peer group for firm f’s segment j.
The sample covers all multi-segment firms from the previous investigation (Table 1,
Panel A).
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Figure 1 shows the relationship between conglomerate discount and variation of
multiples from 1991 to 2003. The black line and the right y-axis display the average
excess value over all firms in one year, where excess value is defined as the natural
logarithm of the ratio between observed firm value and imputed value. The imputed
value is the sum of the imputed values of each segment. A segment’s imputed value
is the sales value of the segment multiplied with the geometric mean ratio of the firm
value to sales of an industry peer group. The grey line and the left y-axis present
the average variation of multiples.

































































The graphs give an indication how valuation uncertainty is related to the con-
glomerate discount and how it changes over time. Between 1991 and 1996 the average
excess value changes from about -0.22 to -0.35 and the standard deviation of multi-
ples within peer groups also changes from about 1 to 8. This is coherent with the
idea that a higher uncertainty of valuation leads to a higher deviation between the
estimated and the observed value. In 1997 and 1998 excess values change from -0.35
to -0.10, while valuation uncertainty increase from about 5 to 40. From 1999 to 2000
there is no clear trend that could explain the relationship between excess value and
valuation uncertainty. Between 2001 and 2003 the standard deviation of multiples
increase sharply from 10 to over 40. On the other hand the conglomerate discount
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is on a very low level.
I would expect that a higher uncertainty of valuation, i.e. a higher coefficient of
variation is related to a lower valuation reliability of the company. In the context of
the conglomerate discount problem one might see a discount or a premium that is not
caused by fundamental characteristics of conglomerate structures but by valuation
accuracy; i.e. the possibility of an over- or underestimation of the conglomerate
discount increases.
To present a more detailed investigation between excess value and valuation un-
certainty I use a regression analysis between the excess value and the variation of
multiples. I calculate uncertainty about valuation for each company according to
equation 2. I use 2 different specifications for the regression. The first specification
is defined by the equation
(Excess Value) = α + β(Variation of Multiples) + ε, (3)
where (Variation of Multiples) is the average standard deviation of multiples over
all segments of a firm and excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio between
observed firm value and imputed value. The imputed value is the sum of the imputed
values of each segment. A segment’s imputed value is the sales value of the segment
multiplied with the geometric mean ratio of the firm value to sales of an industry
peer group. With the first specification I want to test the effect of valuation accuracy
on possible discounts. It is an obvious result that this is only an indication of the
influence of valuation effects because these effects deviate in both directions. The
second specification takes both directions of deviation into account and covers the
possibility of an over- or- undervaluation. It is defined as
|(Excess Value)| = α + β(Variation of Multiples) + ε, (4)
where I use the absolute excess value as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents
the results of my analysis separately for each year from 1991 to 2003. Displayed are
the number of observations, the coefficients for each specification and the significance
levels.
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Table 5: Excess value and uncertainty about valuation
This table displays the relationship between excess value and the variation of multiples
separately for each year from 1991 to 2003. I cover all multi-segment firms. Excess
values is the dependent variable. It is the natural logarithm of the ratio between the
observed firm value and the imputed value. The imputed value is the sum of the
imputed values of each segment. A segment’s imputed value is the sales value of the
segment multiplied with the geometric mean ratio of the firm value to sales of an
industry peer group. The variation of multiples for one firm is the average variation
of multiples over all segments. The variation for one segment is measured as the
standard deviation of peer group multiples. Specification 1 shows the coefficients of
the described regression, specification 2 defines excess value as an absolute value.
year #firms Specification 1 Specification 2
1991 177 0.00203 0.05664∗∗∗
1992 180 0.00203 0.12134∗∗∗
1993 207 −0.02591 0.07281∗∗∗
1994 213 −0.03751∗∗∗ 0.03928∗∗∗
1995 224 −0.01811 0.02639∗∗∗
1996 241 −0.01523∗∗ 0.02076∗∗∗
1997 248 −0.00023 0.01103∗∗∗
1998 260 −0.00032 0.00116∗
1999 301 0.00046 0.00131∗∗
2000 333 −0.00171∗ 0.00037
2001 387 −0.02731 0.05126∗∗∗
2002 399 −0.03102∗∗ 0.00685
2003 400 0.17145∗∗ 0.11129∗
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
The results indicate that there is a relationship between the variation of multiples
and the conglomerate discount. The coefficients of the first regression show that there
is a negative relation between the dependent and independent variable. This means
that a high variation of multiples leads to a high diversification discount. Only in
1991, 1992, 1999 and 2003 the coefficients are positive. Significance indicates that
there is weak relationship between valuation uncertainty and excess value. In 5 years
the regression is significant, while in the remaining 8 years I observe no significance.
The coefficients of the second specification show the relationship between valuation
uncertainty and excess value, independently, whether it is a discount or a premium.
Interestingly, all years except 2000 and 2002 show a significant relationship. I would
26
assume this relationship, because a higher dispersion of multiples leads to lower valu-
ation accuracy and this results in a higher deviation between the observed enterprise
value and the estimated enterprise value. The result is a higher possibility of an over-
or undervaluation.
I conclude, based on the observation of the previous results, that the selection of
peer groups and the definition and determination of industries is of critical importance
to get reliable insights. A higher variation within industries can lead to an over-
or undervaluation, which means that the conglomerate discount or conglomerate
premium might in some cases not only be caused by the conglomerate structure itself
but also by the valuation procedure.
5.2 Conglomerate Discount and Diversification
In this section I test how diversification changes over time and how it is related
to the conglomerate discount. One can assume that a low average diversification
within one year is related to a moderate excess value. On the other hand if I find a
high diversification, which is defined by a higher number of segments per firm and a
higher dispersion of sales over segments, then I would expect a higher diversification
discount. I use three measures of diversification. For each firm f I calculate the









where sgn is the number of segments for firm f, salesj,f is net sales for the segment
j of firm f and salesf are total sales for firm f. If H is equal to one then the underlying
firm has only one segment. If H is close to zero, then the underlying firms has many
segments and each segment has a similar distribution of sales values. The second
and third measure of diversification are the concentration ratios C4 and C8 for firm







Table 6: Descriptive statistics of diversification
This table displays descriptive statistics of three diversification measures. Herf refers
to the Herfindahl index based on segment sales, C4 and C8 are the concentration ratios
for the first four and eight segments, respectively. The last column shows excess value.
All values are averaged over firms.
year #firms Herf C4 C8 EXV
1991 177 0.628 0.972 1.000 −0.221
1992 180 0.613 0.936 0.991 −0.269
1993 207 0.634 0.938 0.995 −0.239
1994 213 0.632 0.938 0.990 −0.279
1995 224 0.640 0.938 1.000 −0.289
1996 241 0.644 0.941 0.997 −0.348
1997 248 0.650 0.957 0.992 −0.328
1998 260 0.657 0.957 0.986 −0.098
1999 301 0.703 0.980 1.000 −0.228
2000 333 0.686 0.970 1.000 −0.191
2001 387 0.717 0.962 0.997 −0.295
2002 399 0.773 0.964 0.997 −0.251






where the C4 concentration ratio measures the share of the four largest segment
sales and the C8 concentration measures the share of the 8 largest segment sales.
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of diversification measures from 1991 to 2003.
I also display excess values in the last column.
Between 1991 and 2003 I detect an increase of the Herfindahl index from 0.628
to 0.766. The C4 measure is similar in 1991 and 2003 but there is an increase
between 1992 to 2003 from 0.936 to 0.964. The C8 measure is in all years close
to 1.000. The increase of the Herfindahl index and the C4 measure from 1992 to
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1999 is coherent with my previous findings that show an increase of the variation of
multiples between 1992 and 1999. In 2000 diversification - measured by Herfindahl
index and C4 measure - decreases, while it continues to increase from 2001 to 2003.
The average conglomerate discount shows a similar pattern. From 1991 to 1997
excess values change from -0.221 to -0.328. In 1998 I detect an extraordinary low
value. From 1999 to 2002 I see significant changes from -0.228 to -0.295 and in 2003
there is a conglomerate premium of 0.020. Between 1991 and 1997 one can explain
the conglomerate discount with an increase of diversification. Between 1998 and 2003
the results provide not such a clear trend.
I will now conduct a regression analysis between diversification and the conglom-
erate discount to get more detailed and reliable results between these two measures.
Table 7 shows the coefficients where the dependent variable is excess value defined
as in the regressions before and three diversification definitions as the independent
variable. I perform one regression for each diversification measure and use OLS as
well as year-fixed effects specifications. This allows me to control for unobservable
time effects.
The results show that all coefficients are positive and significant. The differences
between OLS and fixed effect regression are low, but I see that OLS coefficients
are always higher. The analysis provides evidence that a lower average degree of
diversification is correlated with a lower conglomerate discount.
6 Diversification and Corporate Governance
In this section I relate the diversification discount to corporate governance behavior.
I use the DAX 30 firms for this analysis. I assume that a significant fraction of the
value difference between conglomerates and single-segment firms is caused not only
by higher agency costs due to structural determinants but by corporate governance
and firm policy.
Classical arguments to explain the conglomerate discount are that additional
agency costs arise from ineffective internal capital markets, suboptimal incentive
compensation for managers, information asymmetries between segment managers as
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Table 7: Excess value and diversification
This table displays the relationship between excess value and the diversification mea-
sures Herfindahl index, C4 and C8. It provides coefficients and regression statistics.
Specification 1 shows the coefficients of an OLS regression. Specification 2 shows the
coefficients of a year-fixed effects regression. Values in parentheses show estimation
errors.
variable #firms Specification 1 Specification 2
HERF 3398 0.13794∗∗ 0.12562∗∗
(0.05904) (0.05966)
adj R2 0.0013 0.0071
F Value 5.46 2.88
C4 3398 0.16679∗∗ 0.15654∗∗
(0.05312) (0.05354)
adj R2 0.0068 0.0084
F Value 5.21 3.02
C8 3398 0.17471∗∗∗ 0.16337∗∗
(0.05022) (0.05012)
adj R2 0.0077 0.0052
F Value 6.43 3.22
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
well as increased incentives for rent seeking by managers. Corporate governance
makes it possible to overcome these deficits of conglomerates by providing informa-
tion, control and legal protection. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give a comprehensive
overview about agency problems and the influence of corporate governance, which
supports my idea.
There is a large number of papers that deal with corporate governance and related
topics. Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003) construct a corporate gover-
nance index for German firms and investigate the relationship between corporate
governance and firm value. They show that firms with higher corporate governance
ratings exhibit higher firm values. Their results are statistically significant. Bauer,
Gunster and Otten (2004) examine how corporate governance affects the firm value.
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They use two datasets based on U.K. and European Monetary Union (EMU) firms
and show that a good corporate governance behavior leads to higher firm values.
A good corporate governance behavior in this context is measured by the degree of
“Rights and Duties of Shareholders”, “Range of Takeover Defenses”, “Disclosure on
Corporate Governance” and “Board Structure and Functioning”. Fauver, Houston
and Naranjo (2002) investigate the relationship between the capital market develop-
ment of 35 countries and the conglomerate discount of more than 8,000 firms. They
find that the discount of diversified firms is less extensive in countries, where cap-
ital markets and economic and legal systems are less developed, while it is higher
in countries with well established capital markets and better structural conditions.
They argue that diversified firms obtain benefits from internal capital markets espe-
cially in countries with costly and less developed external capital markets. Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct a corporate governance index for 1,500 firms and
provide evidence that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance
behavior and firm value. Black (2001) supports their finding. He has a sample of
21 Russian firms and shows a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and firm value. Black, Jang, Kim (2005) show similar results for Ko-
rean firms. Beier and Schmid (2005) examine the relationship between corporate
governance and conglomerate discount for a sample of Swiss firms. They find a dis-
count between 14% and 24% but they are not able to provide evidence for a relation
between value loss from diversification and corporate governance behavior. They
only show that single-segment firms have a better corporate governance compared to
multi-segment firms.
I use an index provided by the Institutional Shareholder Service, which is freely
available7 for the DAX 30 firms. It comprises 55 corporate governance criteria within
eight different categories: (1) Audit/Auditor Independence, (2) Board Structure and
Composition, (3) Charter and Bylaw Provisions, (4) Anti-takeover Provisions, (5)
Executive and Director Pay, (6) Directors and Officers Ownership, (7) Progressive
Practices and (8) Director Education. Appendix A shows the complete list of the 55
7source: HANDELSBLATT, Tuesday, January 12, 2005
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governance variables. Corporate governance values for each company are based on
these 55 variables with different weights. The weighting calculations are determined
by the correlation of each variable with various performance measures8. Thus, the
higher the variable correlation significance with specific performance measures is,
the higher the weight of this variable in the rating is. The lower the correlation
significance between the variable and the performance metrics is, the lower the weight
assigned to the variable is9. The corporate governance measure for one company is
provided relative to an underlying index or an industry peer group on a percentile
basis. For instance, a company with a corporate governance index rating of 85 and
a corporate governance industry rating of 91 outscores 85% of its market peers and
91% of its industry competitors. For companies in the United States the underlying
market indices are the S&P 500, the S&P (mid-cap) 400, S&P (small-cap) 600 and
the Russell 3000. For all companies (U.S. and non-U.S.) industry peers are based on
23 industry groups selected from the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)
developed by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poor’s
(S&P). The lowest possible corporate governance value is 0 the highest 100. For the
DAX 30 firms values are measures relative to a GICS industry peer group for each
firm and to the MSCI EAFE index, which covers 1070 international firms. I call the
first method “industry” and the second “international”.
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance value for
a firm from the DAX 30 relative to a peer group of 1,070 international firms and
relative to firms from the same industry based on the GICS classification system.
A corporate governance value of 100 indicates that the firm has the best corporate
governance behavior relative to its peer group, while a value of 0 indicates the worst
behavior.
The firm with the best corporate governance behavior in the DAX 30 is SAP,
which has a relative value of 84.6 in the international environment. DaimlerChrysler
is the best firm relative to its industry peer firms. The mean number of 55.0 shows
8Performance measures are profitability (ROIC, ROE, ROI, EBITDA margin, etc.); valuation (Price
to Book, Cash Flow, and Earnings); market (Tobin’s Q); and, risk (Volatility and Z Score).
9I have no specific information about the true weights of each variable.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance index
This table displays the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance index for the
DAX 30 firms. The first row shows corporate governance behavior relative to a sample
of 1,070 international firms from the MSCI EAFE index, the second row to comparable
firms from the same industry. Index values range between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates
a low corporate governance behavior and 100 a high behavior.
Index type min mean median max std
international index 13.7 55.0 61.3 84.6 23.5
industry index 12.5 53.6 57.9 90.9 24.2
that almost one half of the 1,070 reference firms have a better corporate governance
behavior than the average DAX 30 firms. 53.6% of the firms are worse than the
Dax 30 firms on average. This indicates that German firms have only an average
corporate governance performance.
I construct a simple regression with two specifications to show the relationship
between corporate governance and conglomerate value. The first specification uses
excess value based on median peer group averaging, while the second specification
uses geometric mean. For each specification I perform two separate regressions.
The first contains the corporate governance index relative to international firms,
the second is relative to industry peer firms. I also control for size measured by
the natural logarithm of total assets. Table 9 displays the coefficients and standard
errors.
The results show that all coefficients are positive and significant. This means
that firms with a well established corporate governance behavior tend to be traded
at a lower discount or even a premium, while firms with a low corporate governance
rating are traded at a significant discount10. The differences between specification 1
and 2 are marginal. The coefficients for the industry index are higher than for the
international index. The overall results provide evidence that a good corporate gover-
1026 firms in the DAX 30 are conglomerates. Therefore, all of these should have a conglomerate discount.
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Table 9: Regression estimation of excess value to corporate governance
This table displays the results of the ordinary-least-square regression between excess value
and corporate governance. Specification 1 uses excess value based on median peer group
averaging as the dependent variable, specification 2 uses geometric mean. I perform
two regressions for each specification. One uses the corporate governance index relative
to international firms, the other uses the index relative to industry peer firms. I use
the natural logarithm of total assets to control for size. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
Independent variables Specification 1 Specification 2
international index 0.02067* 0.02175*
(0.01150) (0.01253)
log(total assets) -0.10647 -0.09264
(0.16387) (0.17453)
adj R2 0.0635 0.0546
F Value 1.98 1.84
industry index 0.02751** 0.03017**
(0.01119) (0.01178)
log(total assets) -0.12282 -0.24892
(0.37021) (0.38974)
adj R2 0.1240 0.1360
F Value 3.05 3.28
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
nance is one component that lowers the valuation discount caused by a conglomerate
structure.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates valuation effects of diversification in Germany. While some
papers document only a modest or no discount, I find a significant discount for several
years. The reason is that the other papers cover years with low discounts or calculate
average excess values over several years, which leads to low discounts. There is no
reason why one should assume that there is in general no discount in Germany. I
document that excess values range between -0.25 in 1991 and 0.29 in 2003, while
the average value is -0.10 based on unbiased measures. If I use peer groups that
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contain German and European firms together, I find much higher discounts. This is
not caused by a generic undervaluation of German firms. One reason could be that
the higher number of peer firms leads to more stable results.
I am also able to show that the valuation discount of conglomerates is related to
the extend of diversification. Additionally, I examine the relationship between the
diversification discount and corporate governance and present results that indicate
a positive influence of corporate governance on excess values. The argument behind
this is that corporate governance overcomes the problem of additional agency costs
associated with conglomerates.
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Appendix A: List of Corporate Governance Vari-
ables
This list displays all corporate governance variables use for the calculation of the cor-
porate governance rating. Information are from the Institutional Shareholder Services.
Board Anti-Takeover Provisions
1 Board Composition 34 Anti-Takeover Provisions Applicable
Under Country (local) Laws
2 Nominating Committee Executive and Director Compensation
3 Compensation Committee 35 Cost of Option Plans
4 Governance Committee 36-37 Option Re-pricing
5 Board Structure 38 Shareholder Approval of Option Plans
6 Board Size 39 Compensation Committee Interlocks
7 Changes In Board Size 40 Director Compensation
8 Cumulative Voting 41 Pension Plans For Non-Employee Di-
rectors
9 Boards Served On - CEO 42 Option Expensing
10 Boards Served On - Other
Than CEO
43 Option Burn Rate




13 Board Guidelines 45 Retirement Age for Directors
14 Response To Shareholder
Proposals
46 Board Performance Review
15 Board Attendance 47 Meetings of Outside Directors
16 Board Vacancies 48 CEO Succession Plan
17 Related Party Transac-
tions
49 Outside Advisors Available To Board
Audit 50 Directors Resign Upon Job Change
18 Audit Committee Ownership
19 Audit Fees 51 Director Ownership
20 Auditor Rotation 52 Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines
21 Auditor Ratification 53 Director Stock Ownership Guidelines
Charter/Bylaws 54 Officer And Director Stock Ownership
22-27 Features of Poison Pills Director Education
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